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PERFORMANCE-RELATED PAY, EFFICIENCY WAGES AND
THE SHAPE OF THE TENURE-EARNINGS PROFILE*
by
JOHN G. SESSIONS
University of Bath
and
JOHN D. SKTUN†
University of Aberdeen
Whilst it is well known that performance-related pay (PRP) may
increase wage inequality within a firm, there is an inter-temporal life-
cycle aspect that has been largely ignored in the literature. In this
paper, we investigate theoretically how the introduction of PRP will
influence the wage and remuneration profile over time. We develop a
simple two-period model of efficiency wages that rationalizes recent
empirical findings suggesting PRP flattens the pay-tenure profile. Such
attenuation has important implications for the credibility of long-term
employment contracts as it suggests that agency rather than human
capital considerations drive the profile.
1 INTRODUCTION
Efficiency-wage theory predicts that firms can raise worker productivity by
adopting a carrot and stick approach of paying a supra-competitive wage,
devoting resources to monitoring, and dismissing any workers it detects as
shirking (Shapiro and Stiglitz, 1984).1 By extension, if employment contracts
are multi-period then firms can raise worker productivity by tilting the remu-
neration package over time, paying workers less than the value of their mar-
ginal product when they are relatively short-tenured, and correspondingly
more than the value of their marginal product when they are relatively long-
tenured. Such a pay profile provides workers with ex post rents that they will
be reluctant to jeopardize. If reducing effort increases the probability of
involuntary termination, then upward sloping pay profiles raise the cost of
shirking and induce workers to raise effort.2
* Manuscript received 25.1.14; final version received 4.1.16.
† We are grateful to three anonymous referees and the editors of this journal for helpful com-
ments. The normal disclaimer applies.
1The Shapiro-Stiglitz model regards worker effort as synonymous with productivity. This need
not be the case. Other conduits through which efficiency wages might impact upon produc-
tivity include reduced turnover (Salop, 1979; Stiglitz, 1985), adverse selection (Weiss, 1980)
andworker morale (Akerlof, 1982).
2Recent support for this prediction is offered by Adams and Heywood (2011) who find evidence
from both US and Australian data that deferred compensation, whether in the form of
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An alternative method of raising worker productivity is to divest a share
of the firm into the hands of workers through collective (e.g. profit sharing,
employee share ownership) and/or individual performance-related pay
(PRP) schemes (see Blinder, 1990; Weitzman and Kruse, 1990). Such
schemes, especially individual ones, directly reduce the marginal benefit of
shirking and, therefore, have implications for both the stationary and
dynamic versions of the efficiency wage story. In terms of the latter, intro-
spection would suggest—and empirical work has confirmed—that the
greater the component of total pay that is derived from PRP, then the flatter
is the slope of the pay-tenure profile ceteris paribus (see, for example, Lazear
and Moore, 1984; Brown and Sessions, 2006).
In this paper, we compare and contrast a pure efficiency wage setup
with a mixed PRP framework and rationalize formally the relationship
between remuneration structures and the nature of the pay-tenure profile.
Under reasonable assumptions, we find that effort and remuneration exhibit
a greater tenure gradient under a wage-only contract as compared to con-
tracts where remuneration includes some element of PRP. With pay in wage-
only contracts being higher later on in the firm-worker relationship, they are
also compensatingly lower earlier on as compared with firm-worker con-
tracts that include PRP. The results of the simple model presented below are
therefore compatible with, and lend theoretical support to, previous empiri-
cal findings.
Whilst we emphasize the efficiency wage nature of our model, the study
of involuntary unemployment outcomes is not our main focus. As such, we
deviate from the Shapiro and Stiglitz tradition by not endogenizing unem-
ployment rates.3 There are two reasons for this: First, it allows us to concen-
trate on our main objective of studying payment profiles over time and
across different payment structures; and second, the bonding critique of effi-
ciency wages suggests that involuntary unemployment does not arise with
up-front payments (see Carmichael, 1990). Though we rule out explicit bond
payments, a result of the model has remunerations rising over time, suggest-
ing that younger workers pay an entrance fee to gain higher future payments.
Thus, the involuntary unemployment consequences remain far from clear.
Finally, our model relates to the separate literature that PRP may influ-
ence and increase wage inequality within a firm (see, for example, Lemieux
et al., 2009). Whilst we do not dispute that this may be the case in any partic-
ular period, there is also an inter-temporal lifecycle aspect that has been
largely ignored. Our purpose is to investigate how the introduction of PRP
influences the wage and remuneration profile over time. This approach is as
steeper tenure-wage profiles or pensions, is associated with higher self-reported worker
effort, with the increase in effort declining as the chance of job separation rises.
3A recent paper in this tradition is Basu and Felkey (2009) who find multiple unemployment
equilibria.
2 The Manchester School
VC 2016 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
such novel. We do not seek to determine why and when PRP is paid - see in
this respect, for example, Lazear (2000b), who discusses the use of PRP as a
sorting mechanism when the workforce is heterogeneous, and Gibbons
(2005), who highlights the perennial conflict between offering a fixed wage
for insurance purposes and a variable PRP element to generate the correct
incentives. Our paper is in some aspects similar to MacLeod and Malcom-
som (1998), who in the one sector version of their model find that a fixed
(efficiency) wage dominates when there is unemployment, but that PRP
dominates when qualified workers are in short supply. We, in contrast, do
not seek to determine whether or not PRP dominates a within-period fixed
wage but rather, by appealing to realism, presume that fixed wages and PRP
coexist and thereby investigate how the presence of exogenously determined
PRP might compress life cycle remuneration.
The paper is set out as follows: Section 2 discusses the wage-seniority
nexus whilst Section 3 sets out our modelling framework. Section 4 investi-
gates how the supply of effort depends on pay under wage-only and PRP
schemes, the latter being defined as schemes that comprise both a wage-only
and performance dependent term.4 Section 5 investigates the demand side
decisions by the firm and Section 6 offers some concluding comments.
2 THE WAGE-SENIORITY NEXUS
The positive correlation between seniority and pay is one of the most robust
empirical findings in labour economics—for surveys of the theoretical and
the empirical literature see Hutchens (1989), Carmichael (1990), Polachek
and Siebert (1992), and Lazear (2000a).5 The source of the relationship,
however, is somewhat ambiguous.
The conventional explanation until the 1980s for the relationship was
that earnings reflected the acquisition of, and reward to, general and specific
human capital. Workers became more productive, and hence better remuner-
ated, over time because of investments in training. Workers paid for general
training, and subsidized specific training, by accepting early career (i.e.
training) wages below the value of their marginal product to the firm. Latter
career (i.e. trained) wages reflected the increase in worker productivity; fully,
in the case of general training, and partially, in the case of specific training.
In either case, an upward sloping wage profile emerges; wages increase with
4We use the term contract in a loose sense and interchangeable with payment arrangement,
where the firm does not pre-commit to a particular wage/remuneration profile. Any ensuing
payment profiles are rather a reflection of remuneration policies which are set on a single-
period basis but where, in a two-period setting, period-one decisions are contingent on the
realized pay of period-two.
5The finding is not completely unchallenged—see, for example, Hilmer (2011), Altonji and Wil-
liams (2005) and Dostie (2005).
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seniority because productivity increases with seniority (Mincer, 1958; Becker,
1962; Ben-Porath, 1967).
The human capital explanation was challenged in a series of papers by
Lazear (1979, 1981, 1983) and Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981). Lazear
observes that mandatory retirement and actuarially unfair pension schemes
that encouraged early retirement were incompatible with human capital
theory. Why would firms establish human resource policies whereby an
employee is paid, and thus evidently valued, today but then either forced or
induced to quit tomorrow? Such policies contradict the human capital thesis
that senior workers are paid no more than their marginal product, particu-
larly when wages can be adjusted downwards if productivity declines with
age.6
Lazear reconciles the various phenomena by focussing on contracts
that discourage employee shirking and other malfeasance over an employ-
ee’s life cycle in situations where monitoring worker effort is problematic.
The basic idea is that workers and firms enter into contracts in which pay is
less than the value of the workers marginal product early on in their job ten-
ure, and correspondingly more than the value of their marginal product in
their later years. By back-loading compensation workers receive ex post rents
that they are reluctant to lose. The upward sloping wage profiles increase the
cost of shirking and encourage workers to raise effort.
Lazear’s explanation cuts the link between productivity and pay; wages
grow with seniority irrespective of productivity. And whilst it makes sense
for the firm to pay wages in excess of the value of a worker’s marginal prod-
uct for a period of time, it is not be sensible to do this indefinitely. There will
come a point when the present discounted value of the worker’s marginal
product equals the present discounted value of his remuneration package.
This would imply, from the firm’s perspective, an optimal retirement date
and a need for policies to force or encourage the worker’s retirement.
Several studies have attempted to discriminate empirically between the
agency and the human capital explanations. Hutchens (1987), for example,
focuses on the implicit trade-off between the use of deferred payment con-
tracts and the difficulty of monitoring and finds that Lazear-type character-
istics (i.e. wage profiles, mandatory retirement, pension schemes, long job
tenures) tend not to be associated with jobs that are conducive to monitor-
ing. Similarly, Sessions and Theodoropoulos (2013), using matched British
employer–employee data, find a negative relationship between the slope of
the wage-tenure profile and the level of monitoring.
6Medoff and Abraham (1980, 1981) highlighted a related conundrum in their analysis of data on
pay and supervisor performance ratings. They found that although relative performance
ratings within a particular job grade did not increase with experience in the job grade, rela-
tive pay did. Again, such a finding is incompatible with the human capital position that
earnings increase with seniority because productivity increases with seniority.
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Lazear and Moore (1984), in a US study, address the issue by consider-
ing the empirical evidence regarding the relative flatness of self-employed
workers wage profiles (Wolpin, 1977; Fuchs, 1981). Such a finding is puz-
zling as investments in physical capital would tend to depress observed wages
for the early career self-employed, whilst subsequent returns to those invest-
ments would tend to raise observed future wages. Both factors imply that
the wage profiles of self-employed workers should be steeper than those of
otherwise similar wage and salary workers. Lazear and Moore (1984) ration-
alize the finding by highlighting the duality of principal and ownership
intrinsic to self-employment. Observed wage profiles, they argue, reflect a
disharmony of interests prevalent in the employment relation, a dissonance
that is, by definition, absent from self-employment. By steepening the wage
profile, employers are able to induce their employees to work harder. The
self-employed require no such internal incentive mechanism and thus may
be used as a control group to test the theoretical prior that the profile is
determined primarily by agency as opposed to human capital
considerations.
The UK study by Brown and Sessions (2006) then generalizes Lazear
and Moore’s approach by comparing the earnings profiles of self-employed
workers, wage/salary workers, and workers employed under PRP schemes. If
agency considerations are important in driving the earnings profile, and if
PRP workers face an intermediate degree of agency as compared to wage/
salary and self-employed workers, then the earnings of PRP workers should
increase at an intermediate rate with tenure as compared to these other types
of workers.
Both Lazear and Moore (1984) and Brown and Sessions (2006) find
convincing empirical evidence that it is agency considerations that drive the
pay-tenure profile. Related studies include Flabbi and Ichino (2001), Doh-
men (2004) and Zwick (2011), all of whom find evidence from firm person-
nel records to replicate Medoff and Abraham’s (1980, 1981) finding that
earning increases within firms do not reflect increases in productivity. Exper-
imental evidence supporting an agency driven profile is found by Huck et al.
(2011). In what follows, we endeavour to formally rationalize these various
findings.
3 THE MODELLING FRAMEWORK
We assume a dual-labour market setting comprising a primary-sector offer-
ing high paid jobs in which workers have some discretion over effort, and
who therefore require monitoring, and a secondary-sector offering low paid
menial jobs in which shirking is impossible (Bulow and Summers, 1986).
Our focus is the primary sector and our aim in the following two-period
model is to illustrate the relationship there between agency, worker equity
(i.e. the extent of any PRP) and the nature of the earnings profile. For ease
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of analytical exposition we abstract from considerations regarding human
capital and focus instead on the supply and demand aspects of cost-
minimising contracts offered by a firm in the presence of asymmetric infor-
mation regarding worker effort.7 Two regimes are considered: a wage-only
regime, where firms can only use fixed wages to compensate workers; and a
PRP regime where remuneration comprises two elements; a fixed wage and
an additional component related to individual worker performance. We
assume that both regimes offer single period (i.e. spot) or two-period (i.e.
lifetime) employment contracts. This section outlines the modelling aspects
common to both regimes.
3.1 The Informational Context
To help conceptualize the informational context, consider the time sequence
for each period t illustrated in Fig. 1 following:
The sequence is common to both regimes outlined above. In Stage 1,
for each period t, an effort level is chosen by the worker but is not necessarily
known by the firm. After effort is chosen the worker experiences a shock to
his productivity in Stage 2, which the firm cannot observe. Output, however,
is common knowledge in Stage 3. The firm has then a probability p of
observing the effort of the worker in Stage 4. Finally, in Stage 5, a non-
shirker or undetected shirker is remunerated, whilst a detected shirker is
laid-off.
The key difference between the wage-only and PRP regimes is that PRP
remuneration in Stage 5 is contingent upon the output realized in Stage 3.
This output is itself a function of worker effort and the idiosyncratic shock
to worker productivity in the first two stages. Thus, exerting effort benefits
the worker in two ways under PRP. It makes remuneration more likely in
Stage 5 and also, as PRP is dependent on production ceteris paribus,
increases the remuneration payment through higher average output levels in
Stage 3. This is in contrast to the wage-only case where the output signal of
Stage 3 is not used in determining payment. Nevertheless, a higher non-
shirking effort in the wage-only case still guarantees remuneration in Stage
5, as is the case under PRP. Similar in both regimes is the role remuneration
plays to make the worker exert effort. Indeed, under both regimes the firm
seeks to find the optimal incentive compatible payment schedule that maxi-
mizes profit. This is further outlined in the following sections of the paper
where we show that, though higher remuneration implies higher effort levels
under both regimes, there are several important distinguishing differences
between the wage-only and the PRP regime.
7Thus, any wage growth must be generated solely from agency reasons. Were one to introduce
human capital into to the model then wage growth could emanate from two sources; agency
considerations and human capital accumulation.
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3.2 Output and Effort
We retain the common assumption in the literature that the employer
receives a noisy signal of worker output but is unable to ascertain effort
directly. The key critical difference between the two payment structures is
that PRP remuneration is contingent on the signal whereas wage-only remu-
neration is not.
To be sure, each worker has a stochastic revenue function, yit5hitf etð Þ,
denoting the revenue associated with his job in state i at time t as a function
of effort. We assume that df etð Þ=det  f 0 etð Þ > 0 and d2f etð Þ=det2  f 00 etð Þ
< 0 such that output increases at a diminishing rate with effort. The shift-
parameter, hit, represents a random shock to productivity in state i at time t
and is distributed between two values: a lower value hL, bounded at zero,
and an upper value hH > hL50. For an individual worker, hi reflects relative
misfortune (when it is low) or luck (when it is high). For its part the firm is
able to observe worker revenue, but is unable to observe either worker effort,
et, or luck, hit.
3.3 Worker and Firm Objectives
Workers are identical, risk neutral and endowed with a working life of two
periods. Their separable, periodic utility function is given by ut5mt2gðetÞ,
t5 1, 2, where mt denotes the worker’s remuneration in period t. Remunera-
tion in the wage-only regime is simply a fixed wage ~wt. Under PRP,
total remuneration, w^Tt , comprises both a fixed wage component, w2, and
a variable, performance related output payment with the parameter
k 2 0; 1ð Þ reflecting the relative weight attributed to the latter vis.
w^Tt 5 12kð Þwt1khitf e^tð Þ.8 It is apparent that a wage-only contract is a special
of PRP in which k50 such that w^Tt 5wt5~wt.
FIG. 1. The Informational Context in Each Time Period
8We assume in what follows that the extent of PRP, as measured by k, is exogenous. This is obvi-
ously a simplistic assumption and a more complete exposition would seek to explain the dis-
tribution of different contractual arrangements. Our main focus is nevertheless not on the
causes of different payment schemes but rather on their effect on remuneration profiles over
time. For a theoretical investigation that focuses on the former see MacLeod and Malcom-
som (1998) who show that PRP dominates efficiency wages when vacancy costs are low and
there are few available qualified workers. For empirical evidence see Ortın-Angel and Salas-
Tenure-Earnings Profile 7
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In both regimes g ð Þ is a continuous cost of effort function with g 0ð Þ50
such that no cost is incurred at zero effort. To ensure that the worker’s maxi-
misation problem is well behaved we make the usual assumption that cost is
increasing and convex in effort vis. dg etð Þ=det  g0 etð Þ > 0 and
d2g etð Þ=de2t  g00 etð Þ > 0. We also assume that the (identical) workers either
supply the firm’s required level of effort or shirk by providing less than the
level required.9
The firm’s objective is to maximize per-worker profit, pit5yit2mt.
Whilst able to observe worker revenue, the firm is unable to observe either
effort or luck and is therefore never able to positively identify a shirker.10
The firm is thus obliged to monitor workers as a deterrent and we reflect
this in a probability p 2 0; 1ð Þ of shirking behaviour being detected.11 We
assume that detection of shirking implies instantaneous dismissal. Under a
spot contract, or in the second period of a lifetime contract, this entitles the
worker to claim unemployment utility bt5b > 0 for that period. If caught
shirking in the first period of a lifetime contract then the worker is able to
claim unemployment benefit for period-one and would then face an expected
period-two utility of v25s u2ð Þ wa22g ea2
  
1 12s u2ð Þ½ b, where s u2ð Þ is the
probability of obtaining employment with another firm at an alternate (i.e.
outside) wage wa2, in return for e
a
2 effort, as a function of the period-two
unemployment rate, u2. We assume that the employment function, s u2ð Þ, is
decreasing in u2 such that s0 u2ð Þ < 0 with s 0ð Þ51 and s 1ð Þ50.
We adopt the two-sector framework of Demiralp (2011) in which work-
ers who are dismissed from primary sector firms are unable to regain work
in that sector. Instead they face either unemployment or work in the second-
ary sector where firms perfectly observe effort so that there, by definition, is
an absence of the moral hazard problem that arises in the primary sector.
With effort observable, the secondary sector firm offers wage contracts just
sufficient to induce participation, implying that such workers are indifferent
between working and unemployment. As in Demiralp (2011), detected
shirkers are held down to their reservation utility by firms such that, in our
case, secondary sector period-two pay is given by wa25b1g e
a
2
 
which implies
Fumas (1998) who, in the context of our model, find evidence that k varies across both dif-
ferent sectors and levels of a firm’s hierarchy. They also find that bonus payments increase
with age, although it is unclear whether this is due to a productivity effect or a reflection of a
change in k across age groups.
9Under a wage-only regime there is no benefit to a shirker from supplying any e > 0 such that
shirking is complete with shirking effort e50. This is not necessarily the case under PRP as
there are both costs and benefits from supplying shirking effort e > 0—see Section 4.2
following.
10A possibility arises that with a sufficiently high realisation of luck the firm may be able to iden-
tify lucky non-shirkers. However, to keep matter simple we assume that the firm pays all
workers a uniform wage provided that they are not detected shirking.
11The risk of detection, p, reflects the firm’s ability and incentive to monitor workers. Whilst we
do not model this explicitly, we assume that production and monitoring technologies are
such that it is always optimal for the firm to monitor imperfectly.
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that v25b. Intuitively, to ensure primary sector incentive compatibility, sec-
ondary sector remuneration has to be lower than the primary sector, equilib-
rium non-shirking period-two efficiency remuneration under either a wage-
only or PRP contract.12
To determine optimal remuneration and its relationship with effort, in
both the wage-only and the PRP case, we investigate the supply and demand
side responses of effort to changes in remuneration. Starting with supply
issues, we first determine in Sections 4.1 and 4.2 respectively the incentive
compatible remuneration-effort loci under fixed wages (i.e. where k50) and
PRP (i.e. where 0 < k < 1). After comparing these responses in Section 4.3,
and assuming that firms correctly anticipate these supply-side responses, we
then use the loci to determine in Sections 5.1 and 5.2 the demand side behav-
iour reflected in the remuneration that fixed-wage and PRP firms will opti-
mally set. The overall efficiency remuneration/wage therefore incorporates
both supply and demand side issues.
4 THE SUPPLY SIDE: INCENTIVE COMPATIBLE EFFORT AND PAY
This section determines the supply relationship between worker effort and
remuneration under both the wage-only regime where k50 and the PRP
regime where k 2 0; 1ð Þ. To distinguish between the two payment regimes, we
denote the time dependent level of effort in the wage-only and PRP regimes
as ~et and e^t respectively. We now turn to investigate the supply side of the
two payment schemes in turn.
4.1 Incentive Compatible Remuneration Under a Wage-Only Regime
We investigate first the supply locus of remuneration and effort under wage-
only setting. Consider the one-period (spot wage) case. For a given level of
effort, ~es, there exists a wage, ~ws, at or above which workers will supply (at
least) ~es and below which workers will shirk. Paying ~ws will, in other words,
induce the worker to supply effort ~es. Note that to induce the worker to sup-
ply more effort than ~es, the wage would have to rise beyond ~ws. Such supply
considerations can be summarized by the incentive compatible non-shirking
constraint (NSC), which specifies the lowest wage required for the worker
to supply a given effort level or, equivalently, the maximum effort supplied
12There is compelling empirical evidence of unemployment scarring—see for example Arulampa-
lam et al. (2001), Gregg (2001), Eliason and Storrie (2006), Biewen and Steffes (2010) and
Huttunen et al. (2011). Whether such scarring would be sufficient to limit detected shirkers
to their reservation utility for the rest of their working life is, however, moot. We make the
assumption, which we claim is reasonable in the context of our model, to simplify the expo-
sition. Our focus is on the relative difference in the remuneration profiles between the two
regimes and, assuming wage-only and PRP workers have the same outside options, then any
such scarring should affect both profiles identically. Note further that unless there is full
employment then a detected shirker’s expected period-two utility would be lower than his
period-one utility even without scarring.
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for a given wage. In the spot market one-period case, the NSC under a
wage-only contract, denoted NSCws , requires that the effort exerting utility,
~ws2g ~esð Þ must be at least as high as the expected utility of shirking. As
shirking is complete under a wage-only contract, this latter is given by
the weighted average of unemployment payoff b if detected with probability
p > 0 and collecting the wage ~ws with probability 12pð Þ < 1 vis:
NSCws : ~ws2g ~esð Þ  pb1 12pð Þ~ws (1)
Satisfaction of NSCws implies the incentive compatible (i.e. efficiency) wage
schedule:
~ws5b1
g ~esð Þ
p
(2)
This gives us the required wage at any given level of effort such that workers are
just indifferent between shirking and not shirking. This supply schedule holds
for a variety of wage and effort levels, the precise combinations of which will be
pinned down later when we consider both supply and demand considerations.
Note here that the incentive compatible wage level is a function of three ele-
ments: It is increasing in terms of the worker’s outside unemployment opportu-
nity, b, as the firm will have to pay more to induce effort the better are the
worker’s alternative employment prospects. Second, the wage is high when the
cost of effort, g ~esð Þ, is high as the firm will need to pay the worker more to
induce effort the more costly it is for the worker to do so. And third, the wage is
lower the higher the probability of detecting a potential shirker, as it is the fear of
detection that drives the worker to exert higher effort. Higher detection probabil-
ities thus shade the necessary effort-inducing wage that the firm is compelled to
offer.
Now consider the specification of a two-period lifetime wage contract
~w1; ~w2ð Þ. At the start of the second period the firm and the worker are
locked together in an employment relationship they know will only last for
one more period and as such they face the same effort elicitation considera-
tions as firms and workers contracting in a single-period spot market. Thus,
the wage-effort schedule in period-two is naturally and commonly known to
be given by expression (2) such that ~w25b1 g ~e2ð Þ=p½ . Both the firm and
worker in period-one are able to correctly anticipate the second period effi-
ciency wage such that the period-one effort compatible inducing wage is
dependent on future wages. For example, given any period-one wage the
worker will have more to lose if detected shirking and fired in period-one the
higher the period-two wage. This in turn lowers the necessary period-one
wage required to elicit a particular level of effort.
Formally, the lifetime period-one NSC in the wage-only contract with
no discounting, denoted NSCw1 , is given by:
NSCw1 : ~w11~w22g ~e1ð Þ2g ~e2ð Þ  pb1 12pð Þ ~w11~w22g ~e2ð Þ½  (3)
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where b5b1v2. Undetected shirkers enjoy utility of ~w1 now and ~w22g ~e2ð Þ
tomorrow, where ~w2 is the incentive compatible wage schedule that ensures
workers do not shirk in period-two but instead exert the required period-two
effort. Detected shirkers receive b in period-one and can expect utility of v2
< ~w2 in period-two. Satisfaction of NSCW1 together with the period-two ver-
sion of (2), ~w25b1 g ~e2ð Þ=p½ , yields the period-one incentive compatible
wage-effort schedule:
~w15v21
g ~e1ð Þ2 12pð Þg ~e2ð Þ
p
(4)
Although we have not yet explicitly determined neither the period-one and
period-two profit maximising efficient wages, nor their associated effort lev-
els, these variables will nevertheless have to comply with the supply condi-
tions (2) and (4) respectively. Thus, given that v25b, any resulting wage
profile will have to satisfy:
D~w  ~w22~w15 22pð Þg ~e2ð Þ2g ~e1ð Þp (5)
While we will infer more about the nature of the earnings profile under wage-
only contracts later, we are presently unable to deduce whether the profile rises
or falls with tenure. We can, however, still note the special case of constant effort
where g ~e1ð Þ5g ~e2ð Þ5g ~eð Þ such that (5) reduces to D~w5 12pð Þ=p½ g ~eð Þ > 0.
Intuitively, workers acquire rents on account of the firm’s inability to perfectly
monitor. The firm, however, can reduce these rents by offering lifetime con-
tracts, irrespective of human capital considerations, that induce workers to
queue up to gain access to the second period wage which exceeds their reserva-
tion utility. It should also be noted that whilst we preclude bonds being explicitly
paid up front, younger workers may pay a type of entrance fee by accepting
lower wages in their formative years.
4.2 Incentive Compatible Remuneration under PRP
Consider now a PRP contract in which total actual remuneration, w^T2 , com-
prises both a fixed wage component, w2, and a variable performance related
output payment, hitf e^2ð Þ, with k reflecting the relative weight attributed to
the performance element of the payment vis:
w^T25 12kð Þw21khitf e^2ð Þ (6)
Workers are unable to observe the state of nature, hit, before they exert effort
and so their decision regarding shirking will depend on total expected remu-
neration, w^25E w^
T
2
 
, which is given by:
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w^25 12kð Þw21kE hi2f e^2ð Þf g (7)
where E hi2f e^2ð Þf g denotes the worker’s expected period-two revenue. Aworker
is labelled a shirker if he chooses to exert a level of effort €e2 below the non-
shirking level of effort e^2. In this case, the worker runs the risk of being fired
with probability p> 0 such that the expected payoff to shirking is given by:
pb1 12pð Þ 12kð Þw21kE hi2f €e2ð Þf g2g €e2ð Þ½  (8)
Unlike his wage-only counterpart a PRP shirker will not typically exert zero
effort but will instead apply the level of effort, €e2 2 0; e^2½ Þ, that
maximizes his utility payoff and which is defined implicitly from
k@E hi2f €e2ð Þf g=@€e25g0 €e2ð Þ. It follows from this that shirking is complete and
effort is equal to zero in the special case when k50, that is when a wage-only
contract is offered as outlined in the previous section. Furthermore, shirking
becomes less problematic as the firm introduces PRP (i.e. as k increases) as
shirking now punishes the worker through the lower performance related
element that is part of the wider remuneration package. Indeed, as k
approaches unity and workers are paid entirely on the basis of output, the
shirking problem all but disappears. There are, however, several reasons why
wage-free contracts are rarely observed. If workers are risk averse, for exam-
ple, then they will prefer contracts with at least a modicum of fixed wages in
their remuneration package. And this preference will be further amplified if
capital markets are imperfect thereby making consumption smoothing
across time more difficult. We do not deal explicitly with the determination
of k in what follows but instead leave it as an externally determined parame-
ter that is restricted on grounds of the above discussion.
The spot market/period-two NSC under PRP, denoted, NSCPRP2 , takes
the form:
12kð Þw21kE hi2f e^2ð Þf g2g e^2ð Þ
NSCPRP2 
pb1 12pð Þ 12kð Þw21kE hi2f €e2ð Þf g2g €e2ð Þ½ 
(9)
Here, the fixed wage component of total period-two remuneration is
given by w2. Assuming the constraint holds as a strict equality then the
above expression may be solved for the second period wage-effort
schedule:
w25
pb1g e^2ð Þ2khE hi2f e^2ð Þf g2 12pð Þ kE hi2f €e2ð Þf g2g €e2ð Þ½ i
12kð Þp (10)
Note, however, that it is not the expected wage component per se that deter-
mines whether the worker supplies the required effort but rather the expected
total remuneration, which comprises both a wage and performance related
element. With the use of (10) we determine this latter as:
12 The Manchester School
VC 2016 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
w^25 12kð Þw21kE hi2f e^2ð Þf g 5b1 1p g e^2ð Þ1 12
1
p
 	
kDE2 (11)
where DE25E hi2f e^2ð Þf g2 E hi2f €e2ð Þf g2g €e2ð Þ½ . It is apparent from (11) that
an increase in kDE2 reduces the period-two incentive compatible level of remu-
neration. Intuitively, a fall in the second term of DE2—i.e. E hi2f €e2ð Þf g2g €e2ð Þ -
reflects a fall in the value of period-two shirking thereby alleviating the required
incentive compatible level of pay. pay value of shirking falls. A similar story may
be told by an increase in the first term of DE2—i.e. E hi2f e^2ð Þf g. With kDE2 rep-
resenting the relative PRP gain of not shirking, it then follows that the incentive
compatible level of remuneration falls as this rises.
To assure worker participation in the second period employment rela-
tionship, we assume that the utility derived from within the firm is at least
equal to the utility of unemployment vis. w^22g e^2ð Þ  b. From this and (11)
we deduce that:
w^22b2g e^2ð Þ5 12 1p
 	
kDE22g e^2ð Þ½   0 (12)
Since period-two total expected remuneration, w^2, is anticipated in period-
one it therefore enters the worker’s lifetime period-one NSC, denoted
NSCPRP1 , which can be expressed as:
13
12kð Þw11kE hi1f e^1ð Þf g2g e^1ð Þ1w^22g e^2ð Þ
NSCPRP1 
pb1 12pð Þ 12kð Þw11kE hi1f €e1ð Þf g2g €e1ð Þ1w^22g e^2ð Þ½ 
(13)
Solving for the equilibrium period-one fixed wage element, w1, yields the fol-
lowing wage-effort schedule:
w15
pb1g e^1ð Þ2p w^22g e^2ð Þ½ 2khE hi1f e^1ð Þf g2 12pð Þ E hi1f €e1ð Þf g2g €e1ð Þ½ i
12kð Þp
(14)
Given that v25b, the expected period-one total pay, w^1, for a non-shirker is
thus expressed by:
13Note the right hand side of expression (13) represents the value of shirking in period-one. This
value is maximized when the choice of shirking in period 1 satisfies
k@E hi1f €e1ð Þf g=@€e15g0 €e1ð Þ. As the structure of shocks to productivity does not change
overtime, it is straightforward by a comparison with the equivalent expression for period-
two, set out in the paragraph following expression (8), that shirking effort is intransient
over periods such that €e15€e2.
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w^15 12kð Þw11kE hi1f e^1ð Þf g5b1 1p
 	
g e^1ð Þ1 12 1p
 	
g e^2ð Þ2k DE22DE1ð Þ½ 
(15)
where DE15E hi1f e^1ð Þf g2 E hi1f €e1ð Þf g2g €e1ð Þ½  which denotes, when multi-
plied by k, the instantaneous performance related gain in period-one from
not shirking. In a direct reflection of the discussion following expression
(11) of the analogous period-two gain—i.e. kDE2—it follows that the higher
is this gain then the lower is the total level of remuneration required for
incentive compatibility. An increase kDE2, however, impacts positively on
incentive compatible period-one remuneration as an increase in the gain
from not shirking in period-two reduces incentive compatible remuneration
in period-two, thereby reducing the ex ante period-one value of shirking to
the worker. Thus, the firm responds by increasing period-one remuneration
in order to achieve incentive compatibility.
Consider now the specific case where non-shirking effort is time invari-
ant such that g e^1ð Þ5g e^2ð Þ5g e^ð Þ, which together with shirking effort €e15€e2
as shown by Footnote 14, implies DE15DE25DE. This in turn implies from
expression (15) that the first period remuneration under PRP is given by
w^15v21g e^ð Þ. Compare this to the first period wage in the wage-only con-
tract as given by expression (4), when non-shirking effort is time invariant,
that is g ~eð Þ5g ~e1ð Þ5g ~e2ð Þ, such that ~w15v21g ~eð Þ. In words, if effort (and
thus the cost of effort) is constant across the two time periods then there is
no discernible difference between period-one remuneration across the two
payment regimes, although period-two remuneration differences persist.
Under either payment arrangement, period-one remuneration less effort cost
is equal to outside option utility such that the worker is indifferent between
employment and being dismissed. Nevertheless, the worker finds it beneficial
to remain with the firm as wages and remuneration will rise in period-two.
However, whilst the example is illustrative of the similarities across the two
regimes, it is nevertheless overly restrictive as effort is not guaranteed to stay
constant over the lifecycle as we demonstrate in Section 5.
Though we have not yet defined the efficiency remuneration in each
period that maximizes the firm’s profit, the payment profile must, as was the
case for the wage-only arrangement, satisfy the supply conditions as given
above. From expressions (11) and (15) we find that the total remuneration
profile under PRP must satisfy:
Dw^  w^22w^15 1p 22pð Þg e^2ð Þ2g e^1ð Þ2 12pð Þk 2DE22DE1ð Þ½  (16)
Note that an increase in the term 12pð Þk2DE2 affects the wage profile nega-
tively in two (numerically identical) ways. First, an increase in this term
reduces period-two remuneration as reflected in the discussion following
expression (11); and second, it increases period-one remuneration as
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reflected in the discussion following expression (15). Note also that the term
12pð ÞkDE1 acts in the opposite manner.
4.3 Supply Side Comparisons Between Regimes
We observe by comparing (16) with (5) that it is theoretically possible for the
remuneration gradient under PRP to be less steep than that under a wage-
only contract. Note, however, that the converse is also possible and that
which of the two regimes has the steepest profile will be dependent on the
level of effort.
By way of illustration, consider the special, albeit unrealistic, case in which
effort is invariant across both time and payment schedules implying awage-only
profile of D~w 5 12pð Þ=p½ g ~eð Þ > 0, as shown previously, and a PRP profile of
Dw^ 5 12pð Þ=p½  g e^ð Þ2kDE½   0. As g e^1ð Þ5g e^2ð Þ5g e^ð Þ, it follows that
DE15DE2  DE.14 It is apparent that the wage-only profile is strictly upward
sloping whilst the PRP profile is non-negative by implication of (9). By compari-
son of the expressions above the profile under PRP is flatter than under a wage-
only contract when effort is invariant across payment schemes.
More generally, when effort levels are not time invariant, then we also
note from a comparison of (5) and (16) that the shape of the earnings profile
under pure salary and PRP schemes coalesce when either the extent of PRP
or the impact of shirking on the PRP component of remuneration approach
zero (i.e. as k ! 0 or DE1 ! DE2 ! DE ! 0).
To make more accurate assessments about actual payment profiles,
when effort levels vary both across time and payment schemes we must
extend the analysis beyond simple supply side considerations.
5 DEMAND SIDE ISSUES AND EFFICIENCY PAY
The previous section utilized the non-shirking condition to define the supply
of effort and its relation to pay. With a whole locus of incentive compatible
effort and remuneration combinations, we are however only somewhat closer
to determining what the actual levels of compensation and effort should be.
To tie down the equilibrium values of earnings and effort we now introduce
the demand side with firms setting efficiency compensation to maximize
their profits subject to the workers behaving according to their previous
determined supply pay-effort schedule.15 For clarity of exposition, we distin-
guish individual revenue from the (expected) aggregate revenue,
Yt5F etNtð Þ, of employing Nt identical workers in period t.
14Note from the discussion following expression (8) that €e2 2 0; e^2½ Þ such that DE25E hi2f e^2ð Þf g
2 E hi2f €e2ð Þf g2g €e2ð Þ½  is unambiguously positive.
15We use the term efficiency compensation/pay/earnings/remuneration rather than efficiency
wage when compensation includes more than awage-only element.
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We assume that the firm cannot commit to period-two remuneration in
period-one but instead is left to choose the period specific control variables -
wages and employment—that maximize the period specific profit,
Pt5F etNtð Þ2wtNt, where t 51, 2.16 Such a maximisation problem yields
the Solow (1979) condition for efficiency wages vis. @e=@wð Þ w=eð Þ51 ()
w5e= @e=@wð Þ. The Solow condition characterizes the demand side and as such
will be usedwith the supply information of the previous section.
5.1 Wage-only Contracts
In this sub-section we investigate the wage-only equilibrium effort in each period
by combining both supply and demand behaviour. We can then deduce both the
efficiency wage outcome and effort and how these are profiled over time.
Totally differentiating the period-two wage-effort supply schedule,
~w25b1 g ~e2ð Þ=p½ , implies d~e2=d ~w25p=g0 ~e2ð Þ. By combining this with w5e=
@e=@wð Þ from the Solow (demand side) condition, we derive the profit maxi-
mising efficiency wage, ~w2 :
~w25
g0 ~e2
 
~e2
p
(17)
Substituting (17) into ~w25b1g ~e2ð Þ=p yields an expression for the optimal
period-two level of effort:
g0 ~e2
 
~e22g ~e

2
 
5pb (18)
We repeat the above exercise for period-one by totally differentiating the
supply expression (4), yielding d~e1=d ~w15p=g0 ~e1ð Þ. Using the Solow condi-
tion, we can then solve for the period-one efficiency wage:
~w15
g0 ~e1
 
~e1
p
(19)
Substituting (19) into the left hand side of the supply expression (4) and
rearranging then yields the condition for period-one equilibrium effort:
g0 ~e1
 
~e12g ~e

1
 
5pb2 12pð Þg ~e2
 
(20)
A series of results now follow:
16Thus the firm-worker relationship is of a Crawford (1988) type and facilitates the use of the
Solow condition outlined below in both period 1 and period 2.
16 The Manchester School
VC 2016 The University of Manchester and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Proposition 1: (i) Contractual effort in the wage-only setting is higher in
period-two than in period-one.
(ii) The wage profile in the wage-only setting is upward sloping.
Proof: See Appendix. 
Thus, we have shown that predictions from the agency literature of an
upward sloping wage profile are retained. Taking the two parts of the
proposition together, it is worth noting that the upward sloping wage-
only contract raises the worker’s fear of losing his job in period-two,
which is the period in which the worker is cashing in on the firm
worker relationship. It therefore makes sense for both effort and wages
to exhibit an upward sloping time profile. Note however, that the result
depends heavily on the assumption of constant probability of detection,
and were this assumption relaxed there would no longer be the same cer-
tainty regarding the progression of effort and wages as is outlined in the
above proposition.17
5.2 The PRP Case
We now return to the PRP case in which the firm uses total remuneration,
rather than just the wage, to elicit effort. Thus, we again consider the case
where the firm maximizes profit, E ptf g5E F etNtð Þ2wt Nt
 
, in each of the
two periods.
Using expression (11), the total remuneration-effort period-two (sup-
ply) schedule, yields:
@e^2
@w^2
5
p
g0 e^2ð Þ2k 12pð ÞE hi2f 0 e^2ð Þf g (21)
Combining this with the Solow (demand) condition implies the optimal level
of efficiency pay:
w^25
e^2
p
g0 e^2
 
2k 12pð ÞE hi2f 0 e^2
   
(22)
By using (11) and (22), we are able to determine the profit maximising equi-
librium level of effort:
17As is standard in the literature we thus preclude the possibility that effort affects the probability
of detection. With effort of the non-shirkers affecting the probability of detection of the
shirkers matters are more complex. In order to simplify the analysis we therefore assume
that the firm or supervisor that monitors can detect shirkers at a fixed probability.
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g0 e^2
 
e^22g e^

2
 
5pb1 12pð Þk E hi2f 0 e^2
  
e^22DE2
 
(23)
We can now draw inferences about the effort profile in the PRP case:
Proposition 2: Period-two effort is lower under the PRP setting than the
wage-only setting.
Proof: See Appendix. 
As effort and remunerations are inextricably linked, inferences about
second period differences across the two payment regimes can now also be
drawn:
Proposition 3: Period-two remuneration is greater in the wage-only setting
than in the PRP setting vis. ~w2 > w^

2.
Proof: Proposition 2 implies that g ~e1
 
> g e^2
 
. Given DE2 > 0 from foot-
note 15, Proposition 3 then follows by direct comparison of period-two
wage remuneration under wage-only contracts and PRP from ~w25b1
g ~e2ð Þ=p½  and expression (11) previously. 
It appears from Propositions 1–3 that both second period remuneration
and effort are higher in the wage-only case than the PRP case. This
may reflect the particular agency issues that arise under the wage-only
contract where wages are necessarily higher later on in the relationship.
Thus, with remuneration higher later on in the wage-only arrangement
it implies that period-two effort is also higher. Such a tendency is atten-
uated when the remuneration is a mix of wage-only payments and pay-
ment by performance.
To ascertain period-one effort under PRP, we return to expression (15),
total differentiation of which implies:
@e^1
@w^1
5
p
g0 e^1
 
2k 12pð ÞE hi1f 0 e^1
   (24)
Combining (24) with the Solow condition yields period-one efficiency remu-
neration under PRP:
w^15
e^1
p^1
g0 e^1
 
2k 12pð ÞE hi1f 0 e^1
   
(25)
Using (25) in conjunction with (15), we derive the period-one equilibrium
level of effort:
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g0 e^1
 
e^12g e^

1
 
5pb1 12pð Þhk DE22DE1ð Þ1E hi1f 0 e^1
  
e^1
 
2g e^2
 i (26)
Proposition 4: Period-two PRP effort exceeds period-one PRP effort (i.e.
e^2 > e^

1).
Proof: See Appendix. 
Thus, both PRP and wage-only contracts yield upward sloping effort schedules.
Note, however, that without imposing additional restrictions we are unable to
draw conclusions about whether period-one effort under PRP exceeds period-
one effort under a wage-only setting. Given that we do not know how period-
one effort levels compare across the two remuneration arrangements, it also
follows that period-one remunerations are not easily compared either.
Nevertheless, when lifetime efforts under both regimes are equalized:
Proposition 5: Period-one wages are higher under PRP than under wage-
only contract, when the net value of the wage-only contract does not exceed
the PRP contract and when aggregate lifetime effort under the PRP contract
is at least as high as the wage-only contract.
Proof: With the value of the wage-only contract being given as the sum of
wages net of sum of efforts, ~w12g ~e

1
 
1~w22g ~e

2
 
, across the two periods
and the value of being employed under a PRP arrangement being the sum of
total remuneration net of efforts, w^12g e^

1
 
1w^22g e^

2
 
, over the two peri-
ods, we have: w^12g e^

1
 
1w^22g e^

2
   ~w12g ~e1 1~w22g ~e2 . With the
aggregate lifetime effort condition g e^1
 
1g e^2
   g ~e1 1g ~e2  it follows
that: w^11w^

2  ~w11~w2. As Proposition 3 states that ~w2 > w^2, it follows that
w^1 > ~w

1. 
The condition on which Proposition 5 relies, that the value of the two
types of contract are the same, is of interest as it is the condition when
the participation constraint binds in both instances. In order for the con-
tracts to be both viable and to co-exist, their value will have to be equal-
ized. With the additional restriction on aggregate effort from Proposition
5 in place, the wage profile is then flatter under PRP than under the
wage-only setting.
That intuition for this result is straightforward. Period-two remu-
neration is anchored by the outcome in the spot market and it is rela-
tively easier to satisfy the single period no-shirking condition under
PRP as the firm has an additional instrument at its disposal. Like their
wage-only counterparts, PRP shirkers run the risk of being detected
and fired. Uniquely, however, even if they are lucky and manage to
avoid detection, they suffer from a lower PRP element in their total
remuneration package. As the firms trade off higher remuneration
against higher effort and as it is relatively easier to satisfy the PRP
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non-shirking constraint, it follows that end-period remuneration is lower
under PRP than under wage-only setting. This in turn influences the
period-two level of effort, which is lower under PRP than under the
wage-only regime. Furthermore, there is now also an additional effect
in the first period where, given the lower period-two remuneration
under PRP, it is now relatively more difficult to satisfy the period-one
lifetime non-shirking condition. The PRP firm responds to this difficulty
by raising compensation, and thereby effort, in the first period.
It should be noted that our analysis is contingent on the restric-
tion placed on lifetime effort levels. Relaxing this restriction could
potentially reduce period-one PRP remuneration below period-one
wage-only remuneration. If, for instance, PRP effort is sufficiently low
then the PRP compensation schedule may be consistently below the
wage-only compensation schedule. It is then theoretically possible that
the payment profile is steeper under PRP than under wage-only
arrangements.18
6 FINAL COMMENTS
This paper has focused on the relationship between tenure-earnings pro-
files and the degree of worker equity within an enterprise. We extend
Lazear and Moore’s (1984) thesis that the nature of the profile is pri-
marily a reflection of agency considerations by focusing not only on
those workers with zero or one hundred per cent equity (i.e. salaried
and self-employed workers respectively), but also on those with a frac-
tional level of equity vis. workers remunerated under some form of
PRP.
The shape of the profile has important implications for labour market
behaviour. If the slope is primarily a reflection of human capital considera-
tions then it offers some clue as to the return to on-the-job training and edu-
cational investments. If agency considerations are paramount then it raises
issues concerning the credibility of long-term employment contracts - firms
may have an incentive to fire older expensive, but no more productive,
workers. A time-consistency problem may arise, with particular firms unable
to recruit younger, less experienced applicants because of their inability to
commit not to dismiss them in the future. If, however, the profile reflects
18Note that to derive Proposition 5 we imposed the further condition that the worker’s value of
the wage-only contract does not exceed the PRP value. Such a proviso would, of course,
hold to equality in a market clearing, full-employment economy such that the assumption
underlying Proposition 5 would be satisfied automatically. With unemployment, however,
the values to the workers across payment regimes need not be equalized. Whether or not the
value to the worker is greater under the wage-only or PRP contract is an open question that
we do not tackle here. Instead, we simply observe that Proposition 5 would hold under the
condition stated.
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training then such an incentive-compatibility problem will not arise—older
workers will be more productive ceteris paribus.
The nature of the earnings profile may also impinge upon quitting
behaviour. Longer tenured generally trained workers will have more
manoeuvrability in the labour market than their otherwise similar firm-
specifically trained counterparts. But both types may have more options
than those older workers whose market rents are primarily a reflection of
agency considerations.
A simplifying assumption in the model concerns the state to which
primary workers are (permanently) banished if found shirking vis.
unemployment or lower paid secondary sector employment. Though
scarring from dismissal due to underperformance may be substantial, in
practice it may not be quite as severe as the complete scarring assumed
here. Despite such concerns the assumption may be less restrictive than
it first appears. Our focus is on the relative difference in the remunera-
tion profiles faced by wage-only and PRP workers and assuming that
the two types of workers have the same outside options, any scarring
should affect both slopes identically. If, however, scarring differs across
different types of contracts, then the relationship between worker equity
and the tenure-earnings profile remains uncharted. We leave this possi-
bility open for future discussions as it is beyond the scope of the cur-
rent paper.
To the extent that our results support the view that the tenure-earnings
profile reflects agency costs, they highlight important issues pertaining to
the credibility of long-term employment contracts as employers may be
tempted to replace tenured workers with less costly, but equally productive,
novices. But the latter will not remain young forever, and whether they will
be inclined to work for a firm that is unable to guarantee them employment
in their dotage is an open question.
Moreover, our findings may help to illuminate a hitherto neglected
conduit for the transmission of productivity benefits under collective
PRP schemes such as profit sharing: if capital markets are imperfect
then the same tenure-earnings profile would inspire relatively less shirk-
ing under a profit-sharing as compared to a salaried contract on
account of the lower degree of agency considerations that must be over-
come. Alternatively, the same degree of effort may be obtained from
risk averse workers via a flatter, and therefore less expensive, earnings
profile.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Part (i):
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Note that (18) and (20) jointly imply:
g0 ~e2
 
~e22g ~e

2
 
5pb > g0 ~e1
 
~e12g ~e

1
 
(A1)
Given that g0 ~eð Þ~e2g ~eð Þ is increasing in effort, it follows that ~e1 < ~e2.
Part (ii):
Note that (5) can be written as:
D~w  ~w22~w15 12pð Þg ~e2ð Þ1 g ~e2ð Þ2g ~e1ð Þ½ p (A2)
From (A6) we have g ~e2
 
> g ~e1
 
. It therefore follows from (A2) that D~w > 0.
QED. 
Proof of Proposition 2: Note that the concavity of the production function implies:
E hi2f e^

2
  
2E hi2f €e1ð Þf g
e^2
> E hi2f 0 e^2
  
)
E hi2f e^

2
  
2E hi2f €e1ð Þf g > e^2E hi2f 0 e^2
  
Thus, with g €e1ð Þ > 0 we have:
E hi2f e^

2
  
2E hi2f €e1ð Þf g1g €e1ð Þ > e^2E hi2f 0 e^2
  
)
DE2 > e^

2E hi2f
0 e^2
  
)
e^2E hi2f
0 e^2
  
2DE2 < 0
It, therefore, follows from expression (23) that under a PRP contract:
g0 e^2
 
e^22g e^

2
 
5pb1 12pð Þk E hi2f 0 e^2
  
e^22DE2
 
< pb (A5)
Whereas (18) implies that under a wage-only contract:
g0 ~e2
 
~e22g ~e

2
 
5pb (A6)
As the left hand sides of (A5) and (A6) are both increasing in effort, it follows that
period-two effort is lower under a PRP contract than it is under a wage-only
contract.
QED. 
Proof of Proposition 4: The proof is given by contradiction: Assume contrary to
proposition that e^2  e^1 Second and first period effort levels are given by expressions
(23) and (26) respectively. Subtracting (23) from (26) implies:
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g0 e^1
 
e^12g e^

1
  
2 g0 e^2
 
e^22g e^

2
  
5 12pð Þhk 2DE22DE1ð Þ1E hi1f 0 e^1
  
e^12E hi2f
0 e^2
  
e^2
 
2g e^2
 i (A7)
Given that that the difference between the two terms on the left hand side of (A7) is
positive when e^2  e^1, it follows that the right hand side must also be positive. This is
rewritten below as:
12pð Þ kDE22g e^2
  
1 12pð Þkh DE22E hi2f 0 e^2
  
e^2
 
2 DE12E hi1f 0 e^1
  
e^1
 i>0
(A8)
From (12) we have:
p w^22b2g e^2ð Þ½ 5 12pð Þ g e^2ð Þ2kDE2½   0 (A9)
Thus, we can re-express (A8) as:
2p w^22b2g e^2ð Þ½ 1 12pð Þkh DE22E hi2f 0 e^2
  
e^2
 
2 DE12E hi1f 0 e^1
  
e^1
 i > 0
(A10)
The first term of (A10) is non-positive by virtue of inequality in expression (A8).
Concavity of production implies that if e^2  e^1 then:
DE12E hi1f e^

1
  
e^1 > DE22e^

2E hi2f e^

2
  
e^2 (A11)
Thus the second term of (A10) is negative. A contradiction has thus been generated
and so it must indeed be the case that e^2 > e^

1.
QED. 
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